

Remarks on Nicanor, the Stoics and the Ancient Theory of Punctuation

By DAVID L. BLANK, Los Angeles

Four men's works were excerpted in the commentary which was eventually incorporated into the famous scholia in *Venetus A* of the *Iliad*.¹⁾ Of these Nicanor the punctuator (*ὁ Στιγματίας*)²⁾ has drawn the least interest from modern scholars. This grammarian of the time of Hadrian³⁾ did not endear himself to scholarship by explaining the work of *ὁ γραμματικώτατος* Aristarchus, as had Didymus and Aristonicus,⁴⁾ nor had he as great an antique renown and as famous a father as Herodian, son of Apollonius Dyscolus. What he had was a system of no less than eight marks of punctuation with which he marked the Homeric text, a job for which no more than two marks had been used by other ancient scholars.

Such punctiliousness earned Nicanor little more than ridicule. H. Usener, accustomed to think in terms of the sharp contrast of atoms and void, called Nicanor a *Grillenfänger*.⁵⁾ C. Wendel is not surprised that Nicanor's system of punctuation is not used in any known papyrus, since it is so artificial.⁶⁾ Even L. Friedländer, first editor of the fragments of Nicanor's *Iliad* commentary, though he chided his predecessors for invoking Nicanor without understanding him,⁷⁾ often ridiculed Nicanor without trying to see why he made certain decisions.⁸⁾

¹⁾ See the famous subscription at the end of several books in this commentary: *Παράκειται τὰ Ἀριστονίκου σημεῖα καὶ τὰ Διδύμων Περὶ τῆς Ἀρισταρχείου διορθώσεως, τινὰ δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Ἰλιακῆς προσφθίας καὶ Νικάνορος Περὶ στιγμῆς*.

²⁾ The sobriquet is noted by Eustathius 20.12.

³⁾ *Suda* ν 375 (Adler): . . . *γεγονὼς ἐπ' Ἀδριανοῦ τοῦ Καίσαρος*. This may be an inference from the information transmitted by Stephanus Byz. 35.11 (Meineke): *Νικάνωρ δ' ὁ Ἐρμείου ἐν ἧ' πρὸς Ἀδριανὸν γράφων* . . .

⁴⁾ Cf. R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship* I (Oxford 1968) 214 and 219. The impression, however, that Nicanor was as dependent on Aristarchus as was Herodian (219) is misleading.

⁵⁾ "Ein altes Lehrgebäude der Philologie," *SBAW* 4 (1892) 582-648; rpt. in *Kleine Schriften* (Leipzig 1913) II 264-314, 282.

⁶⁾ "Nikanor (27)," *RE* 17.1 (1936) 274-77, 277.

⁷⁾ *Nicanoris περὶ Ἰλιακῆς στιγμῆς reliquiae emendatiores* (Königsberg 1850) iii: "hae Nicanoris magis decantatae quam excogitatae interpunctiones."

⁸⁾ *Ibid.*, 24: ". . . illud discernendi potius quam discernendi studium," for example.

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In this essay I shall try to make out the beginning of a case that Nicanor's method was neither as strange as it has often seemed, nor wholly divorced from theoretical justification. I shall (I) summarize Nicanor's eight marks of punctuation and their basic applications, as far as we know them from a scholium on Dionysius Thrax's grammar and from their actual appearance in the Homeric scholiasts' excerpts from Nicanor's commentaries.⁹⁾ Next (II) I shall demonstrate that Nicanor's punctuation, which basically distinguishes complete and incomplete clauses, is similar in principle and application to the punctuation theories of his predecessors and that they too only distinguished these two kinds of clause. Finally (III) I shall argue that the concern to distinguish complete and incomplete clauses and the analysis of such clauses is ultimately of Stoic origin. It is to Stoic linguistics, then, that we should look for the theoretical background of Nicanor's system of punctuation.

I.

1. *ΤΕΛΕΙΑ ΣΤΙΓΜΗ*. The longest full stop, lasting four *χρόνοι*¹⁰⁾ and denoting the least degree of connection between the *logos* it follows and the *logos* it precedes, divides two sentences in asyndeton and also follows introductory vocative or exclamatory expressions.

2. *ΥΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΑ ΣΤΙΓΜΗ*. The next longest full stop, lasting 3 *χρόνοι*, divides sentences connected by *δέ* or any other *σύνδεσμος τῶν ἰσοδυναμούντων τῷ δέ: γάρ, ἀλλά, αὐτάρ*.¹¹⁾

3. *ΠΡΩΤΗ ΑΝΩ ΣΤΙΓΜΗ*. This full stop lasts 2 *χρόνοι* of silence and divides sentences connected by the correlatives *μέν...δέ, ἤ...ἤ, οὐκ...ἀλλά*.

4. *ΔΕΥΤΕΡΑ ΑΝΩ ΣΤΙΓΜΗ*. This full stop lasts 1 *χρόνος* and divides sentences connected by *καί*.

5. *ΤΡΙΤΗ ΑΝΩ ΣΤΙΓΜΗ*. This full stop lasts 1 *χρόνος* and divides sentences connected by *τέ*.

⁹⁾ *Scholia in Dionysii Thracis artem grammaticam*, ed. A. Hilgard (*Grammatici Graeci* I 3; Leipzig 1901) 26.4–28.8. Cf. Friedländer, *op.cit.* (n. 7) 1–5 and Wendel, *op.cit.* (n. 6) 276f.

¹⁰⁾ These time indications are discussed by Friedländer, *op.cit.* (n. 7) 119–23.

¹¹⁾ Sch. D. Thr. 26.14f.

6. ὙΠΟΣΤΙΓΜΗ ΕΝΥΠΟΚΡΙΤΟΣ. (or μεθ' ὑποκρίσεως). The first of the marks dividing incomplete clauses is placed between the protasis and the apodosis of an ὀρθή περίοδος, such as those whose members begin with ὄφρα...τόφρα, ἤμος...τῆμος, ὅτε...τότε, ἕως...τέως, ὅπου...ἐκεῖ. It is called ἐνυπόκριτος because of the "dramatic" rise in pitch of the voice at the end of the protasis (ὑπόκρισις), where no breath is permitted and a 1 χρόνος pause precedes the apodosis.

7. ὙΠΟΣΤΙΓΜΗ ΑΝΥΠΟΚΡΙΤΟΣ. This marks a 1 χρόνος pause isolating parentheses (τὰ διὰ μέσου),¹²⁾ especially those inserted between a protasis and its apodosis.¹³⁾

8. ὙΠΟΔΙΑΣΤΟΛΗ. (or [βραχεῖα] διαστολή)¹⁴⁾ This last 1 χρόνος pause has many uses, including: grouping words which ought to be understood together and separating those which ought not, as in Quintilian's *statuam auream hastam tenentem*¹⁵⁾ (πρὸς τὸ σαφέστερον διασταλτέον); separating words which, if understood together, would be in solecistic disagreement; separating relative pronouns from their antecedents, particularly where these are in different cases, a phenomenon which tended to appear to some ancient grammarians as a *schema*;¹⁶⁾ 'separating' clauses of which one is incom-

¹²⁾ Cf. J. Baar, *Untersuchungen zur Terminologie der Ilias-Scholien* (Diss. Hamburg 1952).

¹³⁾ The beginning and end of a parenthesis are both marked and will usually both have the ὑποστιγμή ἀνυπόκριτος, but the practice as preserved in the scholia is not uniform, so that sometimes one διαστολή and one ὑποστιγμή are used and even two διαστολαί. Cf. Friedländer, *op.cit.* (n. 7) 76ff.

¹⁴⁾ The first term is that used in Sch. D. Thr. 24.18, *al.*, the second is the usage of the Homeric scholia. Cf. Friedländer, *op.cit.* (n. 7) 23. Wendel, *op.cit.* (n. 6) 276, says he follows B. Laum's argument (*Das alexandrinische Akzentuationssystem* [Paderborn 1928] 413) that the original term was βραχεῖα διαστολή, while ὑποδιαστολή was substituted by Sch. D. Thr. This theory goes back to K. E. A. Schmidt, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Grammatik des griechischen und lateinischen* (Halle 1859) 521ff. Laum's own thesis is much more ambitious (136ff., 413ff.) and is probably wrong. In addition to Laum's dependence on the dubious twentieth chapter of Ps.-Arcadius (cf. Pfeiffer, *op.cit.* [n. 4] 179 and n. 1-2), there are methodological and interpretative errors in his account. Note that no surviving scholia correspond to the papyrus marks mentioned by Laum (413f.), nor is a διαστολή needed by the syntax of almost any of the passages he cites. See also H. Erbse, *Beiträge zur Überlieferung der Iliasscholien* (München 1960) 384f.

¹⁵⁾ *Inst. Orat.* 7.9.8.

¹⁶⁾ See the testimonia at Lesbos, *περὶ σχημάτων*, c. 19A, ed. Blank (forthcoming), especially Trypho, *de tropis* (ed. M. L. West, *CIQ* 59 [1965]

plete until a verb is supplied from the other and 'joining' complete clauses which may nonetheless be said to have some element *κατὰ κοινόν*; dividing the apodosis from the protasis of an *ἀν(τ)εστραμμένη* or 'turned around' period.

II.

The most basic thing distinguished by the different marks of punctuation is the completeness (*αὐτοτέλεια*) or incompleteness (*ἐλλείπον*) of the *logos* whose end is marked. All five *στιγμαί* mark *αὐτοτελείς λόγοι*,¹⁷⁾ while the *ὑποστιγμή ἐνυπόκριτος* marks a place where one may not pause for breath, *εὐθέως γὰρ ἐπιφέρεται ἢ ἀνταπόδοσις*,¹⁸⁾ and the *ἀνυπόκριτος* shows that the *ἐνυπόκριτος* will eventually follow and close the period. The *βραχεῖα διαστολή* is used to divide phrases which are not—or are not to be treated as—complete unto themselves, but which are rather parts of a complete *περίοδος*.¹⁹⁾

Thus Nicanor's eight-fold system is the elaboration of a two-fold system, distinguishing complete and incomplete phrases with two kinds of punctuation. This two-fold system is present in the oldest account of punctuation, that which Dionysius Thrax gives in the unquestionably genuine beginning of his grammar, in the elaboration of *διαστολή* (pause), which is the third part of *ἀνάγνωσις* (reading aloud). Here Dionysius says:²⁰⁾

Στιγμαί εἰσι τρεῖς· τελεία, μέση, ὑποστιγμή. καὶ ἡ μὲν τελεία στιγμή ἐστὶ διανοίας ἀπηρτισμένης σημεῖον, μέση δὲ σημεῖον πνεύματος ἐνεκεν παραλαμβάνομενον, ὑποστιγμή δὲ διανοίας μηδέπω ἀπηρτισμένης ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐνδεούσης σημεῖον.

As a Byzantine scholiast already saw, the only real *στιγμαί* here are the *τελεία* and the *ὑποστιγμή*, since the *μέση* has to do only with breathing.²¹⁾ Hence some scholars have seen the *μέση* as an interpolation, which may well be the case.²²⁾ To be sure, various Latin

248: *Σχῆμά ἐστι σολοικισμὸς ἀπολογίαν ἔχων, ὡς ὅταν εἴπωμεν, ὁ Φίλιππος, ὃν πάντες μισοῦσιν, ἀγαθός ἐστι* and Apollonius Dyscolus, *synt.* 120.9.

¹⁷⁾ Cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, *adv.* 182.15: *στιγμή γὰρ πᾶσα σημεῖον αὐτοτελείας.*

¹⁸⁾ Sch. D. Thr. 27.29f.

¹⁹⁾ Cf. Sch. Hom. A 225a.

²⁰⁾ *Dionysii Thracis ars grammatica*, ed. G. Uhlig (*Grammatici Graeci I* 1; Leipzig 1883) 7.

²¹⁾ Sch. D. Thr. 24.13, 25.7–11.

²²⁾ Cf. Schmidt, *op.cit.* (n. 14) 515f. and Laum, *op.cit.* (n. 14) 412f. Pfeiffer, *op.cit.* (n. 4) 180 and 219, states without justification that Dionysius used only two stops.

sources speak of *finalis*, *media* and *subdistinctio*,²³⁾ but this seems to be a latter-day systematization, as I shall now demonstrate.

In no piece of ancient commentary is a *μέση* or *media* ever called for; it appears only in theoretical discussions, leading, one to believe that it is a theoretical construct: it fills the space in the line between the high dot of the *finalis* and the low *subdistinctio*,²⁴⁾ and it supplies the mean between the long and short pauses.²⁵⁾ Suspiciously enough, some of the scholiasts on Dionysius Thrax and some of the Latin grammarians claim that the *media* also indicates something about the sense, namely that it is about halfway through, whatever that means: to the ancient commentator there must apparently be a mean between all pairs of extremes.²⁶⁾ One of these scholiasts, however, also claims that the *μέση* would become *τελεία* if the speaker did not go on to the next phrase;²⁷⁾ the phrase closed by a *μέση* must take another phrase after itself, but may not have a “hanging” thought (*κρεμάμενον νόημα*) or show itself to be *ἀτελής*, and it must be followed by another phrase which completes it.

The ancient grammarians also seem somewhat at a loss as to how to exemplify the *subdistinctio* and the *media distinctio*. Diomedes cites *Aeneis* 10.92f. and 2.54 in his discussion of *subdistinctio*:

*huius autem nota est punctum sub versu positum, ut
me duce Dardanius Spartam expugnavit adulter?
aut ego tela dedi fovive cupidine bella?
non enim similiter ut in distinctione silentium interpositum tacere
permisit, ut est illud,
et si fata deum, si mens non laeva fuisset.*

(4.438.7–12 Keil)

²³⁾ Many of these are reproduced by M. Hubert, “Corpus stigmatologicum minus,” *Bull. Du Cange (Arch. Lat. Med. Aevi)* 37 (1970); see also his notes and commentary *ibid.* 38 (1972) 1–166 and 39 (1974) 55–84. See now the useful tabulation and commentary of T. N. Habinek, *The Colometry of Latin Prose* (Diss. Harvard 1981) 45–56.

²⁴⁾ Sch. D. Thr. 177.6: *Ὁ τρεῖς εἰσι στιγμαί, ἀλλὰ τόποι τρεῖς*. Schmidt, *op. cit.* (n. 14) 515, argued that *ὑπο-* in *ὑποστιγμή* originally denoted a ‘weaker’ stop, not one ‘below’ the full stop, and that the *μέση* was introduced only after the *ὑποστιγμή* was conceived primarily as a mark at the bottom of the line. I agree.

²⁵⁾ Sch. D. Thr. 178.19: . . . *τὰ ἄκρα αἰε ποτε ἐναντία ἐστι* and 314.4f.: *ἡ μὲν γὰρ τελεία τέσσαρας ἔχει χρόνους σιωπῆς, ἡ δὲ μέση ἕνα, ἡ δὲ ὑποστιγμή ἡμισυν*.

²⁶⁾ Sch. D. Thr. 178.6f., 313.14ff., 479.31ff., Donat. 4.372.20 Keil, Pompeius 5.133.6 Keil.

²⁷⁾ Sch. D. Thr. 480.7f.

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The parallel version of Dositheus (7.428.19–22)²⁸⁾ cites only the second example, but gives three verses:

*et si fata deum, si mens non laeva fuisset,
impulerat ferro Argolicas foedare latebras
Troiaque nunc staret Priamique arx alta maneret.*

Although the attempt has been made to insert pauses within all five of these lines,²⁹⁾ it is noteworthy that each of the two examples given by Diomedes is the end of a protasis and is followed immediately by an apodosis: 10.94 *tum decuit metuisse . . .*, 2.55–6 *impulerat . . . Troiaque nunc staret . . .* Each example, then, would end with an ὑποστιγμῆ ἐνυπόκριτος on Nicanor's system.³⁰⁾ Diomedes' first two examples of the *media distinctio* are the following:³¹⁾

*Vt belli signum Laurenti Turnus ab arce
extulit et rauco strepuerunt cornua cantu,
utque acris concussit equos utque impulit arma,
extemplo turbati animi, [simul omne tumultu
coniurat trepido Latium saevitque iuventus
effera.]*
(*Aeneis* 8.1–6)

*aut hoc inclusi ligno occultantur Achivi,
aut haec in nostros fabricata est machina muros,*

²⁸⁾ On the relation between the reports see K. Barwick, *Remmius Palaemon und die römische ars grammatica*, *Philologus* Suppl. 15 (1922) 50f. Note, however, that Dositheus' version, though shorter than that of Diomedes, shows better understanding of the common source. Here he makes clear that 2.54ff. is an example of *subdistinctio*. F. M. Brignoli, "L'Interpunzione Latina," *Giorn. It. Filol.* 9 (1956) 24–35, 158–184, does not see this (166). In general Brignoli adds little, but he does recognize the grammarians' "imprecisione e incertezza" concerning the nature and use of the *media*.

²⁹⁾ R. W. Müller, *Rhetorische und syntaktische Interpunktion. Untersuchungen zur Pausenbezeichnung im antiken Latein* (Diss. Tübingen 1964) 79.

³⁰⁾ The standard practice of scholiasts and other writers in noting punctuation is to cite the example, ending with the word before the mark of punctuation. Müller's note (*ibid.*, 79 n. 11: "In bekannten Stücken wird häufig nur der Anfang zitiert.") is incorrect, as is Caesarius' insertion of *post* at Diomedes 4.439.7 (note that Cod. Sangall. omits *post* in the parallel passage of Dositheus 7.429.15).

³¹⁾ Again Dositheus gives only the second example, citing the entire last line, but reading *equi*.

*inspectura domos venturaque desuper urbi,
aut aliquis latet error equo [ne credite, Teucri.]*
(*Aeneis* 2.45–8)

Here too Diomedes leaves off his quotations just where Nicanor would have placed an ἐννπόκριτος ὑποστιγμή, signalling that the apodosis followed immediately.³²) Diomedes' comment on the first passage seems rather confused,³³) but Servius' is not:

est figura ab eo quod praecedit id quod sequitur. distinguendum sane 'error', et sic dicendum 'equo ne credite Teucri'.

He recognizes that this is a period composed of protasis and apodosis. Diomedes' last and more subtle example is also a bit confused:

*item: lectumque iugalem,
quo perii, super inponas*
(*Aeneis* 4.496–7)

minus apertum. subdistinguendum enim est pro voluntate dicentis. hoc enim voluit intelligi Dido, non esse lectum iugalem quo perierit. inmorandum est ergo et respirandum 'iugalem' et sic inferendum cum ὑποκρίσεως affectu 'quo perii'.

(*Diom.* 4.439.2–8 Keil)

*et lectumque iugalem,
quo perii, super imponam:
hoc enim voluit intelligi Dido, non esse lectum . . .*
(*Dositheus* 7.429.11–16 Keil)

Despite the momentary slip in “*subdistinguedum*,” I think Diomedes must still have intended this as an example of a *media distinctio*, as did Dositheus. As Diomedes' and Dositheus' explanation shows, their source took this as an example of the punctuation πρὸς τὸ

³²) I have included the apodoses in angular brackets.

³³) Müller, *op.cit* (n. 29) 82, attempts to set punctuation at the colon boundaries only of the first example and does not mention the second. It is not clear to me how Müller's notation (“die in den beiden ersten Kola der vierkoligen Periode zur Vorbereitung auf equus emphatisch verwendeten Substantiva lignum und machina müssen durch die media distinctio an den Kolonenden zur Wirkung gebracht werden.”) explains Diomedes' (and Dositheus') statement (“confunditur ratio compositionis in generali nomine ligni atque machinae equi”; 4.439.1). Perhaps the punctuation desired by Diomedes' source is some sort of πρὸς τὸ σαφέστερον.

σαφέστερον, which would be a *βραχεῖα διαστολή* for Nicanor. Note, however, that once this instruction is followed and a pause before *quo perii* is read, *quo perii super imponam* becomes a protasis to the following *abolere nefandi/. . . iuvat. . .*; on Nicanor's system, an *ἐνπρόκριτος ὑποστιγμή* might have followed our example. Cassiodorus gives as an example of a *subdistinctio arma* in *arma virumque cano*, saying that it is needed because '*cano*' *respicit ad utrumque* (7.146.5–8 Keil). I think this is a reference to the fact that the next word after *cano*, the relative pronoun *qui*, would have both *arma* and *virum* as antecedents, if no pause were inserted after *arma* (an incongruity for a masculine singular pronoun).³⁴) This is a job of the *διαστολή* in Nicanor. If the examples, but not the reasons for the specific punctuation, in these grammars' sources were taken from commentaries on the *Aeneis*,³⁵) one would have to assume that the examples were not said in these commentaries to demand two different marks of punctuation. Rather the grammarians' source, faced with exemplifying both *subdistinctio* and *media distinctio*, divided the examples up and excogitated the rationales. And indeed, there are no *mediae distinctiones* mentioned in the Vergilian commentators.³⁶)

Also noteworthy in this context is where one ought to use punctuation, according to Diomedes (4.437.24–438.3) and Dositheus (7.429.16–24):³⁷) before *similitudines* (*παραβολαί*), as Nicanor would use the *ὑποστιγμή ἐνπρόκριτος*; before *redditae* (*ἀνταποδόσεις*), again Nicanor's *ὑποστιγμή ἐνπρόκριτος*; before transitions from one person to another—probably before a clause with a new verb and a new subject: a *στιγμή* for Nicanor; before a vocative, Nicanor's *τελεία*;³⁸) before *sed*, Nicanor's *ὑποτελεία*; before *quoniam*,³⁹) again *ὑποτελεία*

³⁴) Cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, *synt.* 122.7ff. on *Ilias* Σ 460.

³⁵) Cf. Müller, *op.cit.* (n. 29) 82.

³⁶) The only plausible example of a *media distinctio* in a Latin grammarian is in Cassiodorus (7.146.10 Keil): *Aen.* 2.234 *dividimus muros et moenia pandimus urbis*. This is similar to Sch. D. Thr. 313.18, which cites H 93 *αἰδεσθαι μὲν ἀνήρασθαι, δεῖσαν δ' ὑποδέχθαι*, but 313.17 cites A 36 *Ἀπόλλωνι ἄνακτι, τὸν ἠύκομος τέκε Λητώ*, which ought to be a *διαστολή* on Nicanor's system, or a *subdistinctio* for the Romans.

³⁷) As Müller recognized (*op.cit.* [n. 29] 77 n. 9), this passage in Diomedes is about *distinctio* in general, not just the *finalis*.

³⁸) Nicanor would also use the *τελεία* after an introductory vocative.

³⁹) Müller, *op.cit.* (n. 29) 77 n. 9, asks "Warum nur bei quoniam, und nicht auch bei quod, quia, cum?" On the practice of taking one conjunction as the standard for each logical form see M. Frede, *Die Stoische Logik (Abh. Ak. Wiss. Gött., Phil.-Hist. Kl. III, 88, 1974) 74f.* Cf. also *infra*.

for Nicanor; before *tunc* in apodosi, Nicanor's *ὑποστιγμὴ ἐννπόκριτος*; before and after interrogatives, Nicanor's *τελεία*. This is almost a summary of the functions of Nicanor's marks of punctuation, leaving out the *διαστολή*. Thus Nicanor and Diomedes/Dositheus' source were looking for similar things in their theory of punctuation.

The same scholia which give us excerpts from Nicanor also mention the views of others as well. Some of these views will have been cited by Nicanor, others by the excerptor; some will have agreed with Nicanor, others not. In any case, both Nicanor and the excerptor seem to feel that whether they agree or disagree, all the views cited about specific punctuations work on similar basic principles, disagreeing only in their specific application.

Individuals whose punctuation is cited are: Ptolemaeus Ascalonita and Seleucus (A 211–2a¹), Ptolemaeus Ascalonita (A 216), Philoxenus (A 231), Ptolemaeus Ascalonita (Γ 155b: *διαστολή*), Heliodorus, Herodian, Ptolemaeus Asc. (E 297c¹), Neoteles (Θ 325a¹: *διαστολή*), Heracleo (N 107a: *στιγμὴ*), Aristocles (T 218–9: *διαστολή*), Aristarchus, Nicias (Φ 110ab¹c¹b²/c²: *στιγμὴ*), Dionysius Thrax, Demetrius Ixio (α 96: *στιγμὴ*). Often *τινές* are cited, as at A 124b (*στίζουσι*), 160a, 580–3a (*ὑποστιγμὴ, ὑποτελεία... τελεία*), B 212–216, Γ 156–8, 158a, 428a, Δ 14–6, 147b (*οἱ ὑπομνηματισταί*), 371–2, 382–3, E 278a¹, Θ 95, K 136–8, 545–6a (*διαστολή*), Λ 385a¹, 802–3a, Ξ 1a, O 187a. Often *ἡ συνήθεια* or *τὸ σύνηθες* is credited with a certain punctuation, as at A 106a², I 57–8, N 623a, Ξ 1a (*ἡ συνήθης ἀνάγνωσις*), O 97a, 346, 437, Π 46a, Ψ 330a, 335–6a, where it either *στίζει* or *συνάπτει*. The picture which emerges from these citations is that even common practice punctuated on grounds Nicanor often agreed with, while other scholars often applied several of the same marks of punctuation used by Nicanor and did so according to principles not too different from Nicanor's own.

Further confirmation of the fact that Nicanor was not up to anything unusual, in his use of punctuation—he just divided the two basic categories, complete and incomplete, among more individual signs—is provided by Quintilian's application of the two-fold system of Dionysius Thrax to the opening lines of the *Aeneis* (*Inst. Or.* 11.3.35ff.).⁴⁰

⁴⁰ F. H. Colson, *Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae Liber I* (Cambridge 1924) 104, finds three marks of punctuation mentioned in 1.8.1: "Superest lectio: in qua puer ut sciat ubi suspendere spiritum debeat, quo loco versum distinguere, ubi cludatur sensus, unde incipiat . . ." Colson equates suspendere spiritum with the *subdistinctio*, versum distinguere with the *media*, and

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Secundum est ut sit oratio distincta, id est, qui dicit et incipiat ubi oportet et desinat. Obseruandum etiam quo loco sustinendus et quasi suspendendus sermo sit, quod Graeci ὑποδιαστολήν uel ὑποστιγμὴν uocant, quo deponendus. Suspenditur 'arma uirumque cano', quia illud 'uirum' ad sequentia pertinet, ut sit 'uirum Troiae qui primus ab oris', et hic iterum. Nam etiam si aliud est unde uenit quam quo uenit, non distinguendum tamen, quia utrumque eodem uerbo continetur 'uenit'. Tertio 'Italiam', quia interiectio est 'fato profugus' et continuum sermonem, qui faciebat 'Italiam Lauinaque', diuidit. Ob eandemque causam quarto 'profugus', deinde 'Lauinaque uenit litora', ubi iam erit distinctio, quia inde alius incipit sensus. Sed in ipsis etiam distinctionibus tempus alias breuius, alias longius dabimus: interest enim sermonem finiant an sensum. Itaque illam distinctionem 'litora' protinus altero spiritus initio insequar; cum illuc uenero: 'atque altae moenia Romae', deponam et morabor et nouum rursus exordium faciam.

Quintilian says one must observe two things: where *sustinendus et quasi suspendendus sermo sit*, which the Greeks call ὑποδιαστολή or ὑποστιγμή, and where *sermo deponendus sit* (this would correspond to στιγμή, indeed to τελεία in Dionysius' system). He proceeds to suspend, that is to mark with a ὑποδιαστολή, *arma uirumque cano*, because *uirum* points forward—that is to say, he punctuates as Nicanor would, with a ὑποδιαστολή (= βραχεῖα διαστολή) before the relative pronoun *qui*. Quintilian also suspends *Troiae qui primus ab oris*, which may not receive a *distinctio* because both whence (Troy) and whither (Italy) are connected by *uenit*, which is κοινόν in both clauses; Nicanor would agree. Next, ὑποδιαστολαί are placed around *fato profugus*, because this is an *interiectio* or, as Nicanor would say in explaining the use of his ὑποστιγμὴ ἀνπόκριτος, διὰ μέσου. Finally, *Lavinaque uenit litora* takes a *distinctio*, because now

cludatur/incipiat sensus with the *finalis*. There is, however, nothing to connect *versum distinguere* with any of the pauses in particular. It may conceivably refer to the pause of one *mora* at verse end which is used to justify the *brevis in longo* in that position (cf. Mar. Vict. 6.71.19ff. Keil) and could be related to the thesis that *brevis in longo* may occur before punctuation in the middle of a line (cf. Sch. D. Thr. 54.27ff., which tacitly uses Nicanor's terminology). It seems perverse to take the two instructions given at 11.3.35ff., say that the shorter full stop is actually the *media distinctio*, and read this into *versum distinguere* in 1.8.1, as Colson does. See also Müller, *op. cit.* (n. 29) 68 and n. 5.

another *sensus* begins, as Nicanor would also say. Quintilian's *ὑποδιαστολή vel ὑποστιγμή*, then, corresponds quite well to Nicanor's *ὑποδιαστολή*⁴¹⁾ and *ὑποστιγμή*, the signs of incomplete sense.

Quintilian then goes on to say that, even among the full *distinctiones*, some are shorter and some longer, depending on whether they mark the completion of the *sensus* or the *sermo*.⁴²⁾ The pause at the completion of the *sensus* with *litora* is thus shorter than that at the end of the opening declaration of the poet (*sermo*) and before the address to the Muses: . . . *atque altae moenia Romae*. Note that the invocation of the Muses begins asyndetically, as Nicanor would want the phrase following a *τελεία στιγμή* to do. Although *multum ille et terris iactatus et alto* also begins with no particle, Latin is more sparing with connectives than is Greek, while the pronoun *ille* surely establishes some connection to what went before and might thus call for Nicanor's *ὑποτελεία*.⁴³⁾

Thus, Nicanor seems to operate with the same basic interpretive aims and the same basic system of punctuation as his predecessors. His innovation consists in making further distinctions in the marks used for incomplete phrases and in quantifying stops which people like Quintilian had been willing to leave to the reader's discretion.⁴⁴⁾

⁴¹⁾ Friedländer, *op.cit.* (n. 7) 22f. and n. 7, wants to make Quintilian's two terms refer only to what Nicanor calls *βραχεία διαστολή*, the *minima distinctio*.

⁴²⁾ Cf. Müller, *op.cit.* (n. 29) 94.

⁴³⁾ The immediately following passage of Quintilian (11.3.39) speaks of pauses "in periodis," noting that sometimes a slight, non-interruptive pause without a breath is required, sometimes a breath is to be stolen without a pause. Müller, *ibid.* 94, wants to recognize the *media* in the breath without pause, but has no suggestion for the pause without breath, which Quintilian clearly wants to be taken in parallel. I believe that both the pauses mentioned here are further refinements the orator should be able to use, but which are too subtle to fit into any system of punctuation.

⁴⁴⁾ Usener, *op.cit.* (n. 5) 282, finds a four-fold system in Diomedes (4.437. 12 Keil: "distinctio, subdistinctio, media distinctio sive mora, vel, ut quibusdam videtur submedia"), reasoning that no one would think that the *media* could also be called *submedia* and that Diomedes must mean: ". . . mora et . . . submedia." This four-point system of punctuation is then worked by Usener into the grammatical system which divides everything into fours and is perhaps to be associated with Tyrannio. The four-fold punctuation mentioned in Sch. D. Thr. 177.19–32 is taken by Usener as a later attempt to improve upon Diomedes' four points. This Greek four-fold system, however, is clearly of rhetorical, not grammatical origin, as the use of *περίοδοι* and *περικοπαί* shows, not to mention the additional mark called *ἐγκοπή*, used to note synaloephe (177.28–32). Points of contact between this testimonium

III.

The original formulation of many grammatical principles in antiquity was the work of the Stoics, whose system was not opposed by, but rather was the basis of technical grammar in antiquity⁴⁵). Problems we would call “grammatical” appeared in two parts of Stoic dialectic, the part *περὶ φωνῆς*, which dealt with expressions or signifiers, and the part *περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν σημαινόμενων*, dealing with things meant or signified.⁴⁶) The basic task of Stoic grammar and rhetoric was to grasp the relation between signifier and signified, so that a one-to-one correspondence between the two obtained in correct language usage, the signifier exactly expressing the thing meant.

The unit among things meant is the *λεκτόν*, of which some are said to be *αὐτοτελεῖ*, others *ἔλλιπῆ*. Diocles of Magnesia describes these as follows:

ἔλλιπῆ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὰ ἀναπάρτιστον ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφορὰν, οἷον Γράφει· ἐπιζητοῦμεν γὰρ, Τίς; αὐτοτελεῖ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπηρτισμένην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφορὰν, οἷον Γράφει Σωκράτης.

(Diog. Laert. 7.63)

These two kinds of *lekta*—or rather their expressions—correspond precisely to the phrases separated by *τελεία στιγμή* and *ὑποστιγμή* in the two-fold system of punctuation. The *αὐτοτελεῖς λεκτόν* has an *ἀπηρτισμένην ἐκφορὰν*, while the *τελεία στιγμή* is a sign that the expression preceding it has a *διάνοιαν ἀπηρτισμένην* (Dion. Thr. 7).⁴⁷)

and Diomedes are hardly to be found. As for Diomedes, his account is so confused (see above, n. 28, 37), that little can be inferred from his precise wording. His account switches almost indiscriminately between using *distinctio* for punctuation in general and for the *finalis* alone. Just after the various names of the *positurae* are given, he says: “*distinctio quid est? appositio puncto nota finiti sensus vel pendentis mora*” (437.14f.). In the discussion of the last example of the *media sive mora*, Diomedes says both “*subdistinguentium*” and “*inmorandum*” (439.5f.). If no one would take a *media* for a *submedia*, perhaps a *subdistinctio* could have been so taken. On Usener’s four-fold system regarding accents, see W. Haas, *Die Fragmente der Grammatiker Tyrannion und Diokles* (S.G.L.G. 3; Berlin 1977) 171f.

⁴⁵) Cf. M. Frede, “The Origins of Traditional Grammar,” *Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science*, ed. Butts and Hintikka (Dordrecht 1977) 51–79.

⁴⁶) Diogenes Laertius 7.43–82.

⁴⁷) This term is also found in the Nicanorean scholia, e.g., A 216 *ἕκαστος γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὸν λόγος ἀπηρτισμένος ἐστὶ . . .*

The test of the incomplete expression is also the same. *Γράφει* expresses an incomplete *lekton* because any listener will expect to hear who is writing. The scholia on Dionysius Thrax, for their part, note that at the site of a *τελεία στιγμή* I may remain silent as long as I like, but when there is a *ὑποστίγμα* I may not remain silent as long as I please, for the listener forces me to add some further phrase.⁴⁸⁾

Punctuation and the pauses it determines will have been part of the Stoics' concern in their theory of "voice," since the length of the pause after a phrase will show whether that phrase is complete or not, and in the theory of the signified, since the pause shows whether the phrase corresponds to a complete *lekton* or not. But it is not always a simple matter to determine when a phrase is complete, particularly in Homer. In *Γ* 433ff.:

... ἀλλά σ' ἔγωγε
παύεσθαι κέλομαι, μηδὲ ξανθῶ Μενελάω
ἀντίβιον πόλεμον πολεμίζειν ἢδὲ μάχεσθαι

are *πολεμίζειν* and *μάχεσθαι* dependent on *κέλομαι*, or are these infinitives used instead of imperatives? In this and many other cases, Nicanor chooses coordination over subordination,⁴⁹⁾ a choice much ridiculed by Friedländer, who attributes it either to Nicanor's blind adherence to Aristarchus' dictum *ὅτι Ὅμηρος διακόπτει τὰς φράσεις*⁵⁰⁾ or to an excessive striving for the greater *ἔμφασις*⁵¹⁾ which the scholia claim that short phrases have.⁵²⁾

While such considerations may play a role in Nicanor's decisions, they would not account, e.g., for statements such as Nicanor sometimes makes to the effect that *ἡ συνήθεια συνάπτει*, but *ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ στίζειν*.⁵³⁾ The *logos* is a reference to the natural, internal coherence of the linguistic system.⁵⁴⁾ In my work on Apollonius Dyscolus, Nicanor's great contemporary, I have shown that this coherence results from the necessary reflection of the signified by the expression. The signified, being intelligible, is itself always in

⁴⁸⁾ Sch. D. Thr. 24.22–27; cf. 480.7–8: ... οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐπιζητῆσαι τὸ ἐξῆς.

⁴⁹⁾ Sch. Hom. *Γ* 434–5ab¹.

⁵⁰⁾ Sch. Hom. N 172a; cf. *Ξ* 169a.

⁵¹⁾ Cf., e.g., Sch. Hom. *I* 375: παρατηρητέον ὅτι ἐμφαντικώτεροι γίνονται οἱ λόγοι θᾶσσον διακοπτόμενοι· ἢ γὰρ ὄργῃ μᾶλλον παρίσταται διὰ τοῦ τοιοῦτου.

⁵²⁾ Friedländer, *op. cit.* (n. 7) 7, 24–30.

⁵³⁾ E.g., Sch. Hom. *Α* 186b¹b³.

⁵⁴⁾ D. Blank, *Ancient Philosophy and Grammar: The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus* (Chico, Calif. 1982) 12–19, 51. Cf. Sch. Hom. *B* 497a: καθ' ἕκαστον ὄνομα ἐκ φύσεως καὶ λόγον διαστολή ἐστι βραχυτάτη...

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rational order. The decision, then, whether or not an expression is complete at any point comes down to a consideration of what is supposed to be expressed, the longer or the shorter sense.⁵⁵) When both senses seem equally appropriate, it seems only logical to prefer the shorter, since one would need some reason to extend an already complete sense.⁵⁶) Hence the expression will be marked with a *στιγμή* sooner, rather than later. If such punctuation seems to leave an expression still apparently incomplete, although it is the expression of a complete sense, the grammarian must find out what *πάθος* the expression has suffered, by which the correspondence of expression-structure and meaning-structure has been disturbed.⁵⁷)

Understanding these methodological presuppositions, which Nicanor will share with other grammatical theorists, will make the reasons for Nicanor's practice clearer. Nicanor would, for example, rather assume in a line such as

βάσκ' ἴθι, ἴρι ταχεῖα, Ποσειδάωνι ἀνακτι/πάντα τάδ' ἀγγεῖλαι
(O 158f.)

that an infinitive is being used instead of an imperative, a common *pathos* in Homer, than that the expressions of two separate, complete senses should be dependent on one another. Friedländer complains⁵⁸) that Nicanor does not follow Aristarchus' simple method of making certain sentences complete by anastrophe of a preposition, such as *EIII* in

ἀλλ' ἐπί τοι καὶ ἐμοὶ θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταίη (Φ 110)—

as *ἐπι* it would stand for the finite verb *ἔπεστι*. But Nicanor agrees with Apollonius Dyscolus that such sentences are complete (i. e., they express complete *lekta*), but are corrupted, lacking a verb:

Προὔπτον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἀποκοπαί εἰσιν, ὡς τινες ὑπέλαβον. . . ἀλλὰ πάθη λόγου ἐλλείποντα ῥήματι· πότε γὰρ ὄλης λέξεως

⁵⁵) *Ibid.*, 35ff., 45. Cf. *Anon. Comm. in Rhet. Aristotelis* 196.12f. Hayduck (*C.A.G.* 21.2): *εἰ μὲν τοιῶσδε στίζωμεν, ἄλλην ἀπαρτίζη διάνοιαν, εἰ δὲ τοιῶσδε ἄλλην . . .*

⁵⁶) This is, indeed, Nicanor's explicit justification in some cases, e.g., Sch. Hom. *B* 56a: *αὐτοτελής γὰρ ὁ λόγος* (also *A* 186b¹b³: above, n. 53).

⁵⁷) On the method of pathology in syntax, see Blank, *op.cit.* (n. 54) 41–9.

⁵⁸) *Op.cit.* (n. 7) 24, 105: "Aristarchus *ἐπι*, Nicanor: *λείπει τὸ ἐστὶ ῥήμα*, unde *ἐπί* legisse putandus est."

ἀποκοπή γίνεται; μαρτυρεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πάθους, εἶγε
πᾶσα ἀποκοπή μέρος τι τοῦ ὅλου λειπόμενον ὑπαγορεύει.

(Apollonius Dyscolus, *synt.* 6.11–7.5)

Friedländer also disagrees vehemently with Nicanor's treatment of independent clauses connected by *καί* or *τέ*. Nicanor separates such clauses with full stops, namely the *α'* and *β'* ἄνω στιγμαί. Friedländer thinks⁵⁹) that many such paired phrases ought not to be separated by pause, as

οἱ με μέγα πλάζουσι καὶ οὐκ εἰῶσ' ἐθέλοντα
Τίλιον ἐκπέρσαι ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον.

(B 130f.)

χειρὶ τέ μιν κατέρεξεν ἔπος τ' ἔφατ' ἔκ τ' ὀνόμαζεν.

(A 361)

On the second of these passages, Nicanor notes that the *στιγμαί* are needed because each clause is a period on its own.

Here, too, a passage from Apollonius Dyscolus clarifies the Stoicizing point of Nicanor's procedure (*synt.* 170.19–171.18):

Οἱ δὴ καλούμενοι ἀθροιστικοὶ σύνδεσμοι ἐκ τῶν προκειμένων
λόγων ἀπὸ κοινοῦ λαμβάνουσιν ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα. ἐντεῦθεν καὶ στιγμῆς
ἀπροσδεεῖς εἰσιν, ὡς ἂν ἔτι ἐχομένου τοῦ προσιόντος λόγου ὡς πρὸς
τὸν ὑποκείμενον. ἐκκείσθω δὲ ὑποδείγματα, ἐκ μὲν τοῦ συνήθους
λόγου καὶ Διονύσιος περιπατεῖ καὶ Ἀπολλώνιος, κοινοῦ
παραλαμβανομένου τοῦ περιπατεῖ· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ

Βοιωτῶν μὲν Πηνέλεως καὶ Ἀήϊτος ἤρχον

Ἄρκεσίλαός τε Προθοήνωρ τε Κλονίος τε [B 494seq.],

κοινοῦ πάλιν παραλαμβανομένου τοῦ ἤρχον. οὐ φημι δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς
πάντως ἐν κοινότητι τὰ τοιαῦτα παραλαμβάνεται, ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ ἐκ κοινοῦ
παραλαμβανόμενα ἐν τιαύτῃ συμπλοκῇ καθέστηκεν, λέγω τῇ ἐκ τοῦ
καὶ τῶν τε τούτῳ ἰσοδυναμούντων. (δείξομεν γὰρ ὅτι ὁ δὲ καὶ πάλιν οἱ
τούτῳ ἰσοδυναμοῦντες παραιτοῦνται τὰς κοινότητας, μετάβασιν ποιού-
μενοι καὶ τῶν πτωτικῶν καὶ ἔτι τῶν ῥημάτων. καὶ ἐνθεν ἀπροσδεεῖς
ὄντες τοῦ παρακειμένου λόγου στιγμῆς αἴτιοι καθεστᾶσιν, ὡς ἔχει
τὰ τοιαῦτα, Διονύσιος μὲν ἔγραψεν, Τρύφων δὲ ἀνέγνω·

⁵⁹) *Op.cit.* (n. 7) 57f.; cf. 58: "Adhuc nostro sensu freti Nicanoris supervacuum in distinguendo operositatem notavimus . . ."

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χωρίς εἰ μὴ ἐπιμεριζόμενα εἴη ἐκ πλήθους, ὡς ἔχει τὸ φιλολο-
γῆσωμεν σήμερον σὺ μὲν κατὰ σχολὴν ἐγὼ δὲ ἐν οἴκῳ·
ἀλλ' ἦτοι μὲν ταῦτ' ἐπιείξομεν ἀλλήλοισιν
σοὶ μὲν ἐγὼ σὺ δ' ἐμοί [Δ 62sq.].

Friedländer, who often tries to pit Apollonius against Nicanor, cites this passage to show that Apollonius, unlike Nicanor, was sparing with interpunction and did not punctuate between clauses, one of which required an understood verb from the other.⁶⁰) Besides overlooking the fact that Apollonius might have used some other mark of punctuation than *στιγμή* in such cases,⁶¹) Friedländer seems to have missed the true purpose of Apollonius' statement.

This passage falls into two parts, one about *καί* and the other "collective" conjunctions, the other about *δέ* and its equivalents (*οἱ τούτῳ ἰσοδυναμοῦντες*; note the appearance of this terminology in Sch. D. Thr. 26.14ff., the description of Nicanor's *ὑποτελεία*).⁶²) The collective conjunctions are said by Apollonius to take a noun or verb from the phrases preceding them and hence not to need *στιγμαί*, since the following phrases still depend on what went before ("Both Dick sees and Jane too."). *Δέ* and its equivalents are said to avoid the sharing of words between clauses, whence clauses joined by these conjunctions are in need of a *στιγμή* and are complete in themselves ("Dick walks. But Jane runs."). The reason for this difference is that *δέ* causes a transition of subjects or verbs (or [*adv.* 182.15] of the *πρᾶγμα*, a word practically synonymous here with *lekton*).⁶³) Apollonius also admits, however, that in some situations,

⁶⁰) *Ibid.*, 51f.

⁶¹) Friedländer takes Apollonius' statements to the effect that *στιγμή πᾶσα σημεῖον ἀποτελείας* (e.g., *adv.* 182.17) as being about punctuation in general. Though Apollonius never speaks of other punctuation besides *στιγμή*, I find it difficult to believe that *ἀποτελεία* was the only thing marked by him and that he did not know the *διαστολή*.

⁶²) Since the scholiast obviously had read Apollonius, it is not clear from whom his words come. Schmidt, *op.cit.* (n. 14) 516 Anm. 10, followed by R. Schneider, *Apollonii Dyscoli Librorum Deperditorum Fragmenta (Grammatici Graeci II 3; Leipzig 1910) 18f.*, does not believe that the *ἡμέτερος γραμματικός ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος* could be Apollonius Dyscolus on the grounds that Apollonius Dyscolus never mentions the *ὑποτελεία* and, indeed, thought that every *στιγμή* was a sign of completeness. Apollonius Dyscolus is mentioned quite frequently in the commentaries on Dionysius, and I doubt whether anyone else could have been meant by "our grammarian Apollonius." Also see the preceding note.

⁶³) *Adv.* 182.13–19: . . . οὔτε ὁ καὶ σύνδεσμος ἐδύνατο παραλαμβάνεσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλος τις τῶν προτακτικῶν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν ὑποτακτικῶν, ὅτι μὴ μόνον αὐτὸς ὁ

which involve “distribution,” *δέ* does not have its usual effect (“Both Dick and Jane are at home, Dick sleeping, but Jane reading.”).

Now it is simply not the case that all Greek sentences containing these conjunctions follow Apollonius’ rule. Apollonius rather describes what he feels is the frequent, or even the proper, practice. What Apollonius seems to be driving at is that the normal conjunction joining sentences in which one element is understood *κατὰ κοινόν* is *καί* or *τέ*, since this sort of conjunction takes a common element naturally. The nature of *δέ* and its congeners, however, is such as to cause a transition from one subject or verb to another between one phrase and its sequel; the normal conjunction separating independent clauses, then, will be *δέ*, etc. Similarly, at *adv.* 182.14ff., Apollonius contrasts *δέ* and *τέ* (or *καί*), saying that *δέ* denotes (*παραστατικός*) completeness and demands a *στιγμή*, while *τέ* causes no completion and demands that another phrase follow, as in “*οὔτε τιμῶ σε οὔτε λαλῶ σοι.*” Note that, both in *adv.* and in *synt.*, all the examples of *καί* and *τέ* connections show the conjunction in both clauses. This suggests that the “normal” or “canonical” usage of *καί* and *τέ* will be in clauses where the conjunction is repeated and that the reason why these conjunctions do not establish completeness is not only that they tend to accept common elements in the phrases they connect, but also that they normally come in pairs whose first member always requires the addition of a second member.⁶⁴)

This sort of normalization of usage, whereby one conjunction is assigned *proprie* (*κυρίως*) to one task, clearly belongs to the milieu of Stoic grammatico-logical theory. One form of expression is selected as the proper representative of one *lekton* or sense. Other expressions which are used to represent the same sense may then be classed as *μεταλήψεις* or “translation-substitutions.” Words used contrary to their own proper usage to substitute for other words are called *καταχρήσεις*. Syntactic constructions used to represent senses to which they do not exactly correspond are seen as “surface variants,” in some way altered from the proper construction (*πάθη*).

δέ, ὡς ἔφην, μιμούμενος τὴν τοπικὴν παραγωγὴν, μετάβασιν τε τοῦ πράγματος σημαίνων. διὸ καὶ στιγμῆς αἰτίος ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτοτελείας παραστατικός· στιγμή γὰρ πᾶσα σημεῖον αὐτοτελείας· ὁ τέ οὐκ ἐδύνατο παραλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ οὐκ αὐτοτέλειαν ποιῶν ἕτερον λόγον ἀπῆτει ἐπὶ τοῦ οὔτε τιμῶ σε οὔτε λαλῶ σοι.

⁶⁴) Cf. Blank, *op.cit.* (n. 54) 22, 35f.

In general, normalization of surface structure enables the Stoic to read-off the deep or logical structure from the expression. Normalization of conjunctions in particular is found in Chrysippus' definitions of the types of non-simple propositions (*οὐχ ἀπλᾶ ἀξιώματα*),⁶⁵) just as it is when our grammarians speak of “δέ and its *ισοδυναμοῦντες σύνδεσμοι*.” Once the truth conditions of the various types of propositions are set and the rule is made that the corresponding conjunctions are only being used properly when these truth conditions are to be maintained, then the logical form of any proposition can be grasped immediately from its expression.⁶⁶)

Nicanor can be seen using these methodological presuppositions in various places. Often Nicanor analyzes the syntax of a passage in such a way as to make a conjunction seem intrusive in the text. Such a conjunction is then said to be *περισσός* or to *πλεονάζειν*, *πλεονασμός* being a common *pathos* or surface disturbance.⁶⁷) Other sentences are analyzed by Nicanor as having the wrong words—words which do not suit their actual structures. These words are then said to be used with the sense of the proper words or to be used instead of them or to be a translation-substitute for them.⁶⁸) At times, Nicanor even uses the specific terminology of pathology in speaking of the “full” or original, undisturbed form of a sentence he is punctuating; one ought to know the “full” form in order to decide on the underlying structure and the appropriate punctuation (but the full form need not always be decisive).⁶⁹)

⁶⁵) Diog. Laert. 7.71ff.; not all the types named here are as old as Chrysippus.

⁶⁶) Frede, *op.cit.* (n. 39) 74f.

⁶⁷) E.g., Sch. Hom. *A* 193–4a: *ἐὰν μὲν οὖν ὑποστίζωμεν, ὁ ἐπιφερόμενος σύνδεσμος περισσός ἐσται, ἦλθε δ' Ἀθήνη . . .*, *A* 280–1a, *A* 714a¹, *M* 10–2, 144a, 374–5, *O* 320–1a¹, *Φ* 226, 556–61, *Ω* 42–3a¹.

⁶⁸) E.g., Sch. Hom. *A* 204a: *ἔσται ὁ δέ κείμενος ἀντὶ τοῦ δή καὶ τὸ τό ἀντὶ ὑποτακτικοῦ τοῦ δ, 388: . . . ὁμως δὲ εἰς τὸ ὅς ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον αὐτὸ μεταληπτέον, 580–3a: . . . τοῦ ἀλλά . . . παραλαμβανομένου ἀντὶ τοῦ δέ, B* 131–2, *A* 688a (here *ὡς* is said to be used for *ὅτι*, a clear indication that in this one function the standard conjunction is *ὅτι*), *M* 141: *εἰως: ἀντὶ τοῦ τέως νῦν κεῖται, οἷον μέχρι τινός· διόπερ οὐχ ὑποστικτέον, ἐπεὶ μὴ κυρίως κεῖται, O* 571a, *Φ* 556–61, 567a¹.

⁶⁹) E.g., Sch. Hom. *Γ* 143a¹: *τὸ δὲ ἐξῆς ἀσύνδετον. εἰ δὲ προστεθῆ ὁ ἀλλὰ εἰς τὸ πλήρες, καὶ ὁ λόγος συνδεδεμένος καὶ ἡ στιγμή ὑποτελεῖα ἔσται* (emend. Erbse), *O* 40: *πληρέστατος δ' ἂν ἦν ὁ λόγος, εἰ καὶ σύνδεσμος ἔκειτο ὁ ὅτι ἢ ὡς· καὶ συνήπτετο ἂν τοῖς ἐπάνω, ἴν' ἦ τοιαύτη ἢ φράσις . . .*

I shall now return to Nicanor's comment on A 361:

χειρί τέ μιν κατέρεξεν ἔπος τ' ἔφατ' ἔκ τ' ὀνόμαζεν.
Sch. Hom A 361: στικτέον ἐπὶ τὸ κατέρεξεν καὶ ἔφατο καὶ ὀνόμαζεν· ἡ περίοδος γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἐκάστη.

Nicanor says each group of words is a period unto itself. When *στιγμαί* are recommended between clauses which share a verb *κατὰ κοινόν*, Nicanor admits that these full stops are not regular or logical, but *ἐν αἰτήματι εἰσιν*, because they are needed for emphasis or demanded by *τὸ πρότερον*.⁷⁰) Since he makes no mention of the fact that the three phrases in A 361 all share a subject in common, but rather he calls them each by itself a period, Nicanor must have felt that dependence can only be the result of sharing a verb, whereas Apollonius Dyscolus speaks of independent clauses as sharing neither a noun nor a verb.⁷¹) Since these clauses are each complete, their connection should, in the normalized system of Apollonius, be accomplished by means of *δέ* or one of its equivalents, which is in place where the verb changes between two clauses. The punctuation with *στιγμαί* is thus clearly called for by the independence of the clauses, and these *στιγμαί* should be *ὑποτέλειαι*, these being the marks belonging with *δέ*. But if the poet did not write . . .*δέ*.. .*δέ*, but rather *τέ* . . .*τέ* . . .*τέ*, then he had to have a reason—namely not to give great separation and even contrast to these clauses, as the *ὑποτέλειαι* demanded by *δέ* would have done. Hence Nicanor, while punctuating with *στιγμαί*, would use the *γ' ἄνω*. This causes a silence which lasts the same amount of time as a *διαστολή*, the mark he would have used if the clauses were dependent on one another for a verb *κατὰ κοινόν* and if therefore *τέ* . . .*τέ* . . .*τέ* were being properly used.

This practice seems to represent a compromise between the Stoic theory as explained by Apollonius and the superficial approach of one who wanted only to render Homer's expression properly. On this view the main distinction with which the Stoics were concerned—whether or not a *logos* was complete or incomplete—is made by the setting of *στιγμή* or of *διαστολή* and *ὑποστιγμή*. But the fact that Homer, unlike a logician, was out to do more than just express a certain meaning perfectly causes the interpreter to want

⁷⁰) E.g., Sch. Hom. E 317a; cf. Friedländer, *op.cit.* (n. 7) 52f.

⁷¹) *Synt.* 170.20; on Nicanor see Sch. Hom. © 346–7a and Friedländer, *op.cit.* (n. 7) 55, 57f.

to understand and do justice to some of Homer's intentional perturbations of surface structure. In other instances, where for example a conjunction superfluous to the presumed logical syntax threatens to mislead the reader into punctuating incorrectly, thereby mistaking the true meaning, Nicanor points out the true logical connection and punctuates accordingly, the most important function of language being to express meanings as clearly as possible.

Linguistic Theories in the Rhetorical Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus *)

By DIRK M. SCHENKEVELD, Heemstede (Holland)

0. The last decades have seen the publication of several important studies on the history of ancient linguistics. The period before Apollonius Dyscolus has especially been in the limelight, and gradually it has become clear that the authenticity of the *Techne* ascribed to Dionysius Thrax and the level of linguistic studies at the time of Aristarchus and his pupils form a pivotal problem.¹⁾

All these studies have one omission in common, in that they have all neglected the *opuscula rhetorica* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (DH) as a possible source of information for the level of linguistic knowledge in the second half of the first century B.C. As I hope to prove, these works cast some light on this matter. It is, however, outside the scope of this article to relate here these results to the problem indicated above.

*) Dionysius Hal. (DH) is quoted after the Teubner edition of H. Usener-L. Radermacher (1899–1904), by chapter, page and line. Ep. Amm. = the second Letter to Ammaeus. Rhys Roberts 1901 and 1910 refer to the well-known translation and commentaries of *The Three Literary Letters and On Literary Composition* resp.; Aujac = *Dénys d'Halicarnasse, Opuscules rhétoriques III*, par Germaine Aujac et Maurice Lebel, CUF 1981. Vol. I (1978) is cited as Aujac I; Pritchett = *Dionysius of Hal., On Thucydides*, transl. by W. K. Pritchett, Univ. Cal. Pr. 1975; Usher = *Dionysius of Halicarnassus, The Critical Essays in two Volumes*, with an English translation by Stephen Usher, Loeb Cl. Libr., 1974. Dr. Pauline Allen kindly corrected my English.

¹⁾ See W. Ax, *Aristarch und die "Grammatik"*, Glotta 60, 1980, 96–119 and literature cited there.